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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
The past year has provided the first real opportunity for
observing the Code of Civil Procedure in operation. On the
whole, the decisions of all of the appellate courts of Louisiana
indicate that it is working well in actual practice. None of these
decisions indicate any need of legislative change of its pro-
visions. A single case confirms, rather than indicates for the
first time, the need of supplementary legislation - and this, for-
tunately, in an area in which the Louisiana State Law Institute
has been working for some months.
In certain technical areas to which in the past the trial and
appellate courts have been compelled to devote considerable time
and attention, such as the field of the exceptions, the Code of
Civil Procedure appears to have effectively minimized this waste
of judicial energy. On the other hand, the field of appellate
procedure, which was liberalized to a considerable extent by the
new procedural Code, has been the subject of many more appel-
late decisions than had been anticipated. The principal factor
responsible for this unexpected development seems to have been
professional unfamiliarity with some of the changes made in
appellate procedure, particularly the reduction of procedural
delays. It is to be hoped that, with increasing professional
familiarity with these new rules, the appellate courts will be re-
quired to devote less time and attention to their enforcement.
JURISDICTION
Two of the most important decisions of the intermediate ap-
pellate courts during the past term were on the subject of juris-
diction in personam over nonresidents.
With respect to foreign corporations, our existing legislation
taps the full potential of jurisdiction in personam permitted by
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.1 We are much
*Professor and sometime dean, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. The writer has discussed this subject in Jurisdiction Under the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure, 35 TUL. L. REv. 501, 507-13 (1961).
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less fortunate with respect to statutory grants of jurisdiction
in personam over nonresident individuals, partnerships, and un-
incorporated associations. In fact, beyond the Nonresident Mo-
torist Act,2 the Foreign Watercraft Act,8 and the Direct Action
Statute,4 no effort has been made in Louisiana to tap the full
jurisdictional potential.
The resulting hiatus is spotlighted by De Marcy v. Keystone
Exploration Co.,5 where the action was dismissed because it was
instituted in an improper venue. The suit was filed in Lafayette
Parish against a Texas partnership to recover damages to the
plaintiff's home allegedly sustained as the result of defendant's
geophysical explorations in Vermilion Parish. At the time these
explorations were being conducted, defendant maintained a
branch office in Vermilion which had supervision over these op-
erations, and also a branch office in Lafayette Parish. The
branch office in Vermilion was closed immediately upon com-
pletion of the geophysical work in that parish; the Lafayette
office was closed later, some little time before the institution
of the suit. The venue point presented is clear and requires no
extended consideration.6 The serious point thrust into promi-
nence, however, is that even had the venue been proper, under
existing law there is no statutory provision for a valid service
of process, unless the serving officer is fortunate enough to
locate an employee of the defendant transiently here on business
of the partnership.
Present limitations on jurisdiction in personam over nonresi-
dent individuals, partnerships, and unincorporated associations
are causing difficulty in all American jurisdictions. A few of
the states have recently adopted statutes granting such juris-
diction to their courts. 7 Some of these have gone too far, with
the result that particular provisions have been held unconstitu-
2. LA. R.S. 13:3474, 13:3475 (1950).
3. Id. 13:3479-13:3482.
4. Id. 22:655.
5. 137 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
6. The suit was filed several weeks before the effective date of the new pro-
cedural Code. The venue was improper under LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 165
(2, 9) and LA. R.S. 13:3236 (1950), since repealed; but would have been
proper under LA. CODE OF' CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 42(5), 5251(11) (1960). How-
ever, the procedural rules in effect at the time of the institution of the suit
governed. La. Acts 1960, No. 15, § 4(B) (2) (b).
7. Illinois: ILL. ANN. STATS. C. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd, 1956) ; Maine: ME.
REV. STATS. c. 112, § 21 (Supp. 1960) ; Maryland: MD. CODE art. 23, § 92 (1957) ;
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55-145 (Repl. 1960); Washington:
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (1957); Wisconsin: Wis. STATS. § 262.05 (Cum.
Supp. 1961).
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tional. The difficulty which confronts the draftsman here is*
that the law in this area is in a state of flux, and no one can
predict with accuracy just how far the United States Supreme
Court will permit the states to move. The Louisiana State Law
Institute has been working on such a statute for some months,
and it is believed that work can be completed in time for its
legislative adoption in 1964.
Forbess v. George Morgan Pontiac Co." also involved jurisdic-
tion in personam, although fortunately it does not point to any
existing hiatus in this area of our procedural law. There, plain-
tiff proceeded by attachment on the sole ground of the nonresi-
dence of the defendant Arkansas corporation, and procured the
seizure in Louisiana of a pickup truck belonging to the defend-
ant. The latter moved to dissolve the attachment on the ground
that the plaintiff had lured defendant into sending its pickup
truck into Louisiana through fraud and deceit, and excepted to
the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant.
Simultaneously, under a reservation of its exception and motion
to dissolve the attachment, defendant moved contradictorily to
recover attorney's fees and other damages resulting from the
fraudulent attachment. The trial court dissolved the attach-
ment, rendered judgment for the defendant for $330.00 attor-
ney's fees and other damages, and otherwise dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the majority of the Court of Appeal for the Second
Circuit increased the attorney's fee to $250.00 (the maximum
prayed for by defendant), but refused to award other damages
on the ground that none had been proved. However, the appel-
late court reversed the dismissal of the suit, holding that by
seeking to recover damages for the illegal attachment, the de-
fendant had submitted to the court's jurisdiction over it in per-
sonam.
The only quarrel which the writer has with the majority
opinion is with respect to the award of damages for the illegal
attachment. Though no actual damages were proved, it is be-
lieved that the court could have awarded defendant $100.00 as
nominal damages. Further, even though the doctrine of punitive
damages was discarded by the Supreme Court of Louisiana near-
ly a half-century ago,9 its ghost still appears to be haunting two
8. 135 So.2d 594 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), noted, 36 TUL. L. REV. 875
(1962).
9. In Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So.
541 (1917).
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of the fringe areas of our law.10 Pertinent here is the rule that
when the plaintiff does not act maliciously, the only damages
which the defendant may recover for the dissolution of a con-
servatory writ are his actual damages." Is there a negative
pregnant lurking in this rule, which permits a court to award
punitive damages when the plaintiff has acted maliciously? If
so, the facts of this case, as found by both courts, would have
justified the court in - to use the vernacular -throwing the
book at the plaintiff.
The jurisdictional point involved in this case has aroused
considerable professional interest, and some criticism. 2 The
writer completely agrees with the majority holding that, by
seeking the recovery of damages for the illegal issuance of the
attachment, the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. This result is called for by the specific language of the
general appearance article of the new Code, which provides
that "a party makes a general appearance which subjects him
to the jurisdiction of the court and impliedly waives all
objections thereto when, either personally or through counsel,
he seeks therein any relief" other than the exceptions spelled
out in the article. 13 None of these exceptions include a defend-
ant's rule for damages for the illegal issuance of a writ of
attachment. The dissenting judge of the appellate court was
of the opinion that the defendant did not submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the court because his rule for damages was
not a "demand relating to the merits of the suit."'14 But the
rules relating to the general appearance are not bottomed upon
any defense of the suit on its merits. A defendant makes a
general appearance whenever he affirmatively invokes the juris-
diction of the court. A nonresident defendant's motion to re-
lease attached property under bond has nothing to do with
the merits of the case; but it subjects him, and has always
10. Not pertinent here is the rule which permits the trier of fact, in deter-
mining the quantum of damages, to take into consideration the financial condition
of the defendant. Lacaze v. Horton, 100 So.2d 252, 254, 255 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1958), and cases cited therein. This rule, rationalizing the idea that being forced
to kneel on one knee is greater punishment for a one-legged man than for one
with both limbs, is an atavistic throwback to the doctrine of punitive damages.
11. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sneed, 167 La. 432, 119 So. 417
(1928) ; and Finance Security Co. v. Mexic, 188 So. 657 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1939). The older cases supporting this rule are cited in Comment, 12 LA. L. REv.
433, n. 2 (1952).
12. See Note, 36 TUL. L. REV. 875 (1962).
13. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 7 (1960).
14. 135 So. 2d 594, 599 (1a. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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subjected him, to the jurisdiction of the court.15 Some restric-
tion of the effect of a general appearance was made by the new
procedural Code, 16 but both sound public policy and the need
for orderly rules of procedure preclude further restriction.
Inter alia, the dissenting opinion states :17
"The majority correctly holds that a defendant is en-
titled to damages and attorneys' fees for the wrongful
issuance of a writ of attachment. In my humble opinion, it
is a very hollow remedy indeed to grant a non-resident de-
fendant the right to damages for wrongful attachment of
his property and tell him in the same breath that in order
to get those damages, he must submit to the jurisdiction of
our courts on the suit brought against him by the seizing
plaintiff...."
Louisiana law grants many rights to nonresidents; but are
these hollow remedies because these nonresidents may have to
enforce them in our courts, and thus submit to the adjudication
of any rights which the Louisiana defendants may have against
these nonresidents? Further, so far as this writer knows, the
"hollow remedy" to which the dissenting judge alludes is the
procedural law of every American jurisdiction. It has always
been the law of Louisiana. Prior to 1886, a defendant had to
file a separate suit to recover his damages after the dissolution
of a conservatory writ; but in that year the rule was relaxed,
to permit the defendant to reconvene for his damages in the
same suit.'8 The new procedural Code further relaxes the rule,
and now permits a defendant to recover such damages by con-
tradictory motion.' 9 Regardless of the mode of procedure em-
ployed, however, when the defendant affirmatively invokes the
jurisdiction of the court, he submits himself thereto.
15. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 7 (1960); First National Bank of
Arcadia v. Johnson, 130 La. 288, 57 So. 930 (1912).
16. A motion for an extension of time to plead does not constitute a general
appearance under LA. CODE OF CIviL PROCEDURE art. 7(2) (1960). Prior to
1960 it constituted a general appearance which subjected defendant to the juris-
diction of the court. Modisette & Adams v. Lorenze, 163 La. 505, 112 So. 397
(1927) ; Stanley v. Jones, 197 La. 627, 2 So.2d 45 (1941).
17. 135 So.2d at 599.
18. By La. Acts 1886, No. 50, J 1, amending LA. CODE OF PaAcioz art. 375
(1870).
19. LA. CODE OF CIvIL PRoCEDmu art. 3506 (1960).
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ACTIONS
Abatement
In Dumas v. United Staes Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 20 the
husband sued under the Direct Action Statute to recover dam-
ages for physical injuries sustained as the result of the negli-
gent driving of his wife. At the trial, the defendant insurer
admitted the negligence of the wife. After the trial, but before
judgment, the husband died from causes unrelated to the acci-
dent. His executor, surviving wife, and major daughter all
moved to be substituted as plaintiff. The trial court held that
the action had survived, and rendered judgment in favor of the
executor. The intermediate appellate court held that, under
Article 2315 of the Civil Code as it then read,21 the action sur-
vived only in favor of the wife, and rendered judgment for a
reduced amount in her favor.22 Under certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed, and dismissed the suit. The grounds assigned
were that the negligent wife could not profit from her own
wrongdoing; and that, further, the cause of action was extin-
guished by confusion.
Certainly, this case presents very close questions on which
reasonable men may differ. This writer, however, finds validity
in the objections to the Supreme Court opinion voiced by both
of the able authors of the student notes on the case,28 to which
the reader is referred.
Abandonment
The trial court dismissed the action in Plaisance v. Blan-
chard24 because of the plaintiff's failure to take any active step
in its prosecution for more than five years.25 The plaintiff
instituted this action to be declared the owner of certain im-
movables, but died prior to the trial in the lower court. Subse-
quently, an attempt was made to substitute his heirs as plain-
20. 241 La. 1096, 134 So.2d 45 (1961), noted 22 LA. L. REv. 695 (1962) and
36 TuL. L. REv. 355 (1962).
21. Prior to amendment by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.
22. Dumas v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 125 So.2d 12 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1960).
23. See Notes, 22 LA. L. Rav. 695 (1962), 36 TuL. L. REV. 355 (1962).
24. 135 So.2d 612 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
25. Under LA. CrvIL CoDE art. 3519 (1870), prior to amendment by La. Acts
1960, No. 30, § 1. The rules governing the abandonment of an action for failure
to prosecute are now to be found in LA. CODE or CIVIM PRocEDUaE art. 561
(1960).
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tiffs, and the trial court rendered judgment in their favor. On
defendant's appeal to the Supreme Court, the latter held on
November 7, 1955, that there had been an improper substitution
of parties since one of. the plaintiff's heirs was an unrepre-
sented minor; and the case was remanded to the trial court
for proper substitution of plaintiffs. No application for rehear-
ing was filed in the Supreme Court. On November 10, 1960,
the substituted plaintiffs ruled the defendant into the trial court
to show cause why the case should not be regularly assigned for
trial. The defendant then moved to dismiss for want of prose-
cution; and this motion was sustained by the trial court. On
appeal to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit,26 the dismissal was
reversed. The intermediate appellate court pointed out that the
decision of the Supreme Court was not final until the expira-
tion of the fourteen-day delay for applying for a rehearing;
and since the substituted parties took an active step in the
prosecution of the case within five years of the expiration of
this delay, the action could not be considered abandoned.
PLEADING
The Petition
One of the simplifications of pleading made by the new pro-
cedural Code is effected through the general rule that "a final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not de-
manded such relief in his pleadings and the latter contain no
prayer for general and equitable relief."27 This article has
already paid dividends. Twice during the past term, the inter-
mediate appellate courts have invoked it to reverse dismissals
in the courts below based on defective prayers, when the peti-
tions as a whole showed that plaintiffs were entitled to relief,
though not that prayed for.28
Motion for Summary Judgment
This valuable procedural device, made available to Louisiana
26. In the meantime, the jurisdiction of the appellate courts of Louisiana had
been changed by the amendment of LA. CONST. art. VII, pursuant to La. Acts
1958, No. 561. Under this appellate reorganization, the intermediate appellate
court had jurisdiction over the second appeal.
27. LA.. CODE *OF CIVIL PROCEDURE- art. 861 (1960). Under this article, a
default judgment is excepted from the application of the rule.
28. Dugas v.. Insurance' Company of St. Louis,, 134 So. 2d 634 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1961) ; Doucet v. Landry, 140 So.2d 690 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). . ;
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for the first time by the Code of Civil Procedure, was the sub-
ject of only one appellate decision.29 The facts: disclosed by the
allegations of the petition and the proof supporting the motion
for summary judgment are not of sufficient professional inter-
est to repeat here. For present purposes, it suffices to point
out that the opinion supports the court's holding that several
issues of material fact were left open; and defendant was not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Of greater professional
interest is a question which the court did not consider it neces-
sary to answer.
30
Exceptions
For years, the courts of Louisiana had consistently held that,
under the articles of the Code of Practice, the defendant waived
all objections to the trial court's lack of jurisdiction rationepersonae when he permitted a default judgment to be rendered
against him.3 1 In 1951, with Taliaferro, J., dissenting, the Court
of Appeal for the Second Circuit had held the contrary in the
Thornton case.3 2 The identical question was again presented to
the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, in Frederick v. Popich Ma-
rine Construction, Inc.;83 and that appellate court refusing to
follow the Thornton case, applied the rule of the prior juris-
prudence. The question has become academic with the adoption
of the new procedural Code, which expressly requires the objec-
tion of improper venue to be urged prior to answer or default.8
4
The distinction between the cumulation of two or more
separate actions in the same suit and plural prayers for relief
based on the same cause of action is procedurally important.
An exception lies to dismiss one of two or more separate causes
where the petition discloses no right or cause of action with
respect thereto; but the exception does not lie if a single cause
of action is asserted and the petition discloses a right to any of
29. Snell v. Intercoastal Airways, Inc., 139 So.2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
30. "[W]hether it is proper to use a discovery deposition, taken by' the de-
fendants of the plaintiff as on cross examination only, to support this motion
for summary judgment"? 139 So.2d at 72. The writer believes that LA. CODE OF
CIVIL PuocnmDRE art. 966 (1960) requires an affirmative answer tb the question:
The plaintiff may always present his version of the controversy in affidavit form.
Ibid.
31. See cases cited in Note, 12 LA. L. REV. 503 (1952).
32. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 56 So.2d 308 (La.' App. 2d Cir. 1952),
noted 12 LA. L. REV. 503 ('1952)%.
33. 136 So.2d 423, (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
34. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 7, 925(4),: 928 (1960).:
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the plural relief demanded. In two cases decided during the
past term, the intermediate appellate courts were compelled to
make this distinction; and in both, these courts found that the
plural demands of the plaintiffs were based on single causes
of action. In one,8 5 plaintiff sought to be recognized as the
owner of mineral royalties and also to recover a brokerage fee.
In the second,8 6 plaintiff sought relief in the alternative on
the same cause of action. In both, the exceptions which had
been the proper pleading), the court treated it as such and
cases remanded for further proceedings. No provision in the
new procedural Code changes the prior jurisprudential rules
on the subject, which were applied in both cases.
Incidental Demands
For some years, Louisiana jurisprudence attributed a con-
siderable degree of sanctity to the label designating a particular
pleading, especially in the field of the exceptions. Under the
liberalization of our procedure by the appellate courts during
the past quarter-century, this emphasis on labels has gradually
diminished. During the past term, it was virtually discarded in
Treigle v. Patrick.s 7 There, a defendant sought to reconvene
against a co-defendant. Since the pleading complied with all
requirements of the third party demand (which would have
been the proper pleadings), the court treated it as such and
disregarded the label affixed by the pleader.8 8
JURY TRIAL
Three cases presented questions of procedure in jury trials.
In Arrington v. McCarty,8 9 and its companion case,40 the plain-
tiffs had prayed initially for jury trials. Two sets of defend-
ants, each seeking to throw liability upon the other, filed "cross
actions" ;41 and one set moved for a separate trial of the issues
35. Bailey v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 134 So.2d 339 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1961).
36. Lindsay v. Treadaway, 138 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
37. 138 So.2d 652 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
38. LA. CODE OF CxvIL PROCEDURE art. 5051 (1960). Further, the new Code
offers a direct analogy. "If a party has mistakenly designated an affirmative
defense as an incidental demand, or an incidental demand as an affirmative de-
fense, and if justice so requires, the court, on such terms as it may prescribe,
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation." Id. art. 1005.
39. 136 So.2d 119 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
40. Woods v. McCarty, 136 So.2d 122 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
41. Technically, there are no cross actions recognized by LA. CODE OF CIvIL
PROCEDUaRE (1960) comparable to the cross claim of Rule 13 (g), FED. R. Cirv. Pxioc.
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raised by the defendants' incidental demands. The other set of
defendants, while not opposing the request for separate trial,
moved to rescind the order granting a jury trial of these issues
on the ground that the request for trial by jury came too late.
This motion was sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the
intermediate appellate court held that since plaintiff had timely
requested jury trial, all other parties were entitled thereto; but
further held that, since the new Code prohibits piecemeal jury
trials of the same case,42 the defendants were not entitled to a
separate trial by jury of the issues raised by their incidental
demand. The case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. The appellate court's decision appears to indicate
that the trial court could still grant a separate trial of the
incidental demands,43 but not a separate trial by jury.
One question which calls loudly for an answer that this
writer cannot supply is how appeals were ever taken in these
two cases from the orders of the trial court denying separate
jury trial of the issues raised by the incidental demands. Ob-
viously, the orders were interlocutory; and it would strain the
imagination to the breaking point to say that they caused
irreparable injury. For these reasons, it would seem that the
defendants had no right of an appeal at this stage of the pro-
ceedings, and that their sole remedy would have been to invoke
the supervisory jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court.44
Piecemeal appeals are not only burdensome to the appellate
courts, but when they also stay further proceedings in the trial
courts they delay and obstruct the administration of justice.
The third case involving jury trial,4 5 tried prior to the effec-
tive date of the new procedural Code, highlights one change
made by the latter. After the entire jury had been accepted by
both sides, sworn, and seated in the jury box, the trial judge
excused two of them when challenged peremptorily by one of
the litigants. The appellate court held this action to have been
proper prior to January 1, 1961; but was careful to point out
that the trial judge no longer had this discretion.4
The appellate court must have been referring to third party demands whereby.
the opposing set of defendants were called in as third party defendants.
42. "[I]n all cases there shall be but one [jury] trial." LA. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE art. 1735 (1960).
43. The court may order the separate trial of the principal and incidental
demands. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1038 (1960).
44. Cf. Putnam & Norman v. Levee, 180 La. 101, 156 So. 189 (1934).
45. Little v. Hughes, 136 So.2d 448 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
46. "After the entire jury has been accepted and sworn, no party has the
1963]
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" APPkLLATE JURISDICTION, AND PROCEDURE
The flow of cases transferred to the intermediate appellate
courts by the Supreme Court during the past ten years or so,
on the ground of lack of appellate jurisdiction, has been so
heavy and continuous that any reversal of this current seems
as newsworthy to lawyers as the mythical man-bites-dog in-
cident appears to journalists. Yet, precisely this occurred
during the past term.4 7 An appeal from a judgment sustaining
the legality of a paving assessment levied by a parish was trans-
ferred to theSupreme Court by a court of appeal on the ground
that the latter had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. 48
Procedure
In one case,49 an appeal from a moneyed judgment was dis-
missed on the ground that the judgment had not become effec-
tive, since it had been signed in chambers and not in open
court.50 While the legality of the judgment had to be tested by
the applicable rule of the Code of Practice, which was in effect
at the time, the same result would have obtained under the new
procedural Code. 51
The new Code retained the traditional Louisiana rule that
an appeal cannot be taken by a party who acquiesced in the
judgment voluntarily and unconditionally. 52 The basic reason-
ing of the prior jurisprudence on the subject was followed in
Thompson v. Bland Produce Co.,5 3 which held that the defend-
ant had not acquiesced in the judgment voluntarily when he
paid the amount thereof to release a judicial seizure of his
property in execution of the judgment. Defendant's devolutive
appeal was held valid.
right to challenge peremptorily." LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1766
(1960).
47. In Police Jury of St. Tammany Parish v. Oaklawn Land & Improvement
Co., 137 So.2d 126 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
48. Under. the appellate reorganization which went into effect in 1960, the
Supreme Court retained appellate jurisdiction over cases "in which the con-
stitutionality or legality of any . . . local improvement assessment . . . levied
by . . . any parish . . . is contested." LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(1), as amended
pursuant :to La. Acts 1958, No. 561.
49. Panzica v. Interdiction, 132 So.2d 906 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). The
title of the case is confusing. Actually, the judgment was rendered in favor of
Charles J. Panzica and against Mary E. Panzica, an interdict.
50. As required by LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 543 (1870).
51. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 1911 (1960), which retains the
general rule that all final judgments must be read and signed in open court.
52. Id. art. 2085 (1960).
53. 134 So.2d 336 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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* Since the Louisiana State Law Institute realized the initial
danger of the new Code's shortening of the period for taking
a devolutive appeal from one year to ninety days,54 every effort
was made to publicize this change and to warn lawyers of its
danger. Apparently, these efforts paid off, as the anticipated
toll of dismissed devolutive appeals did not materialize. In the
first 5 of three cases on the subject the delay allowed by the
Code of Practice had commenced to run but had not elapsed
on the effective date of the new Code. The appeal, taken within
the delay allowed by the former code, was held timely under
the transition provisions of the statute adopting the new Code. 56
In the second case,57 the trial judge had orally denied an ap-
plication for a new trial in open court, and several days later
signed a written order to this effect. The appeal was taken
within ninety days of the written order, but more than ninety
days after the oral denial of the application. The appeal was
dismissed as untimely. The third case on the subject"8 indicates
the price which must often be paid for the professional penchant
for discarding the musical score and playing by ear. An appeal
from a city court judgment not taken within ten days of the
denial of an application for a new trial was dismissed as un-
timely.59
Several cases involved the validity of the bonds furnished
by appellants for a suspensive appeal. In one, 60 the intermediate
appellate court applied the prior jurisprudential rule that a
single bond sufficed for multiple appellants from a single judg-
ment; and in another,6' a single bond was held sufficient in
appeals from separate judgments, where the cases had been
consolidated for trial, and a single opinion for both had been
written by the trial judge. In a third case, 62 the appeal, insofar
54. By LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2087 (1960).
55. Martin v. Vapor Honing Co., 140 So.2d 721 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
56. La. Acts 1960, No. 15, § 4(B) (2) (a) provides that the adoption of the
new Code should not "decrease or shorten any procedural delay granted or
allowed by any law in existence immediately prior to, and which had commenced
to run but had not yet completely elapsed on, the effective date of this act."
57. Simon v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Company, 138 So. 2d 464 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962).
58. Travelers Indemnity Company v. Allen, 134 So.2d 355 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961).
59. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5002 (1960). Strangely enough,
this article did not change the procedural law with respect to appeals from any
of the, city courts of New Orleans. See the former LA. R.S. 13:1971 (1950),
repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 3.
,60. Succession of; Abraham, 136 So.2d 471 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
61. Phillips v. West, 139 So.2d 274 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
62. Roy v. Roy, 138 So.2d 417 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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as it operated suspensively, was dismissed because the amount
of the appeal bond had not been fixed by the trial judge, in a
case where the new Code63 required this. The appeal, however,
was sustained as a devolutive one.
The most important decision in this area of the law is Davis
v. LeBlanc." In an action to rescind the sale of immovables,
plaintiff had obtained a judgment in the trial court ordering
defendant to return the $20,200 purchase price, and to pay
plaintiff $1,727.90 damages sustained. Defendant timely peti-
tioned for a suspensive appeal, which was granted on condi-
tion that he furnish a $3,500 appeal bond. Plaintiff immediately
ruled defendant into court to show cause why the suspensive
appeal should not be dismissed because of the insufficiency of
the appeal bond. The trial judge dismissed this rule, and plain-
tiff invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the intermediate
appellate court to force defendant to increase the amount of the
bond. The appellate court very properly held that the appeal
was actually one from a moneyed judgment, and ordered plain-
tiff to furnish a bond of one and a half times the amount of
the judgment and accrued interest. The important feature of
this decision, however, is contained in a footnote of the appel-
late court's decision.6 5 Therein, the defendant's attention was
directed to the fact that the decision of the appellate court,
rendered in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, became
final the day it was rendered ; 6 and that defendant had only
four days from this date to furnish the proper suspensive ap-
peal bond.6 7
The new rules requiring timely payment of all fees to the
clerk of the trial court and imposing on him the duty of filing
the record of appeal in the appellate court appear to be work-
ing well. However, two appeals were dismissed because of the
appellants' failure to pay these fees timely to the trial court
63. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2124 (1960).
64. 139 So.2d 224 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
65. Id. at 226, n. 1.
66. Under LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 5124 (1960), the appellant had
four days, exclusive of legal holidays, to supplement his original bond, or to
furnish a new bond, after rendition of judgment holding the original bond insuf-
ficient.
67. Unless this delay was interrupted by a stay order issued by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. Differently, a decision of
an appellate court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction becomes final when
a rehearing is refused, or the delay for applying therefor has expired. LA. CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2167 (1960).
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clerk. In both,"" the delay in filing the transcript of appeal was
held imputable to the appellants.
Wischer v. Madison Realty Co." might well be the subject
of a law review article, for which an apt title would be "An
Extended Journey Through the Judicial Stratosphere." The case
was originally appealed to the Supreme Court, but as a result
of the appellate reorganization of 1960,70 the appeal was trans-
ferred to an intermediate appellate court. The latter dismissed
the appeal because of the tardy lodging of the transcript, and
the appellants applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari to review this dismissal. Our highest court granted the
writ, and reversed the decision of the intermediate appellate
court under a holding that the late filing of the transcript must
be held imputable to the clerk of the trial court, and not to
appellants.
The plaintiffs' appeals from the judgment of the trial court
signed on May 29, 1959, was originally made returnable to the
Supreme Court on August 5, 1959. Successive orders rendered
by the Supreme Court extended the return day through July 7,
1960. On that day, the appellants obtained from the Supreme
Court another extension of the return day until August 8, 1960,
and the record of appeal was lodged in that court prior to that
date. After the transfer of the case to the intermediate ap-
pellate court, the appellees moved to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the record had not been filed in the Supreme Court
on or before the return day. This motion was based on the
contention that the power of all appellate courts to extend re-
turn days had been withdrawn and transferred to the trial
courts on June 20, 1960;71 and since no extension had been
68. Murry v. Southern Pulpwood Insurance Company, 133 So.2d 827 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Jackson v. Dupont, Incorporated, 140 So.2d 463 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1962). In the first of these cases 'both parties appealed from the judg-
ment of the trial court. Defendant timely and properly perfected its appeal,
but plaintiff failed to file the appeal bond and to pay the necessary fees to the
clerk of the trial court.
69. 242 La. 334, 136 So.2d 62 (1961).
70. Particularly under LA. CONST. art. VII, § 30, as amended pursuant to
La. Acts 1960, No. 593, authorizing the transfer by the Supreme Court of all
cases then pending before it of which the intermediate appellate courts were
given jurisdiction under the appellate reorganization.
71. Since the new procedural Code did not become effective until January 1,
1961, and the appellate reorganization went into effect on July 1, 1960, the
reforms of appellate procedure to be effected by the former were put into effect
immediately by transitional legislation providing rules identical with those of the
new Code. LA. R.S. 13:4438 and 13:4445 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960,
No. 38, § 1, granted power to the trial courts to extend the return days of all
appeals granted by them, and imposed the duty of filing the record of appeal in
1963]
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granted by the .trial court thereafter, the lodging of the tran-
script after July 7, 1960, was untimely.7 2 The majority of the
Supreme Court 75 reluctantly agreed that its July 7, 1960, exten-
sion of the return day was ineffective, but neatly sidestepped
the impact of this contention by holding that, under the transi-
tional statutory provisions, 7 4 the failure to file the record of
appeal timely must be imputed to the clerk of the trial court,
and not to the appellants. This conclusion was bottomed on
the absence of any indication in the transcript, and the lack of
any assertion by appellees, that appellants failed to pay the
proper fees timely.
The facts of this case occurred during a transitional period,
and the case itself will have no particular value as a precedent.
It does, however, provide a happy ending of an otherwise tech-
nical and drab chapter of our civil procedure.
Article 2128 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inter alia, in-
corporates the provisions of the old praecipe of transcript
statute,7 5 permitting the appellant to designate those portions
of the record to be included in the transcript of appeal, and
permitting the appellee to cross-designate those portions that
he wants included. The succeeding code article, however, pro-
vides that when an appellant designates portions of the record
to be included in the transcript, "he must serve with his desig-
nation a concise statement of the points on which he intends to
rely, and the appeal shall be limited to those points. ' ' 76 Although
this provision was not complied with by the appellant in Weber
v. Press of H. N. Cornay, Inc., 77 the appellate court refused to
dismiss the appeal, holding that the appellees had not been
prejudiced or surprised because of the omission. The failure of
an appellant to comply with this requirement could easily
prejudice an appellee, who cannot otherwise designate with any
degree of safety those portions of the record which he may need
the appellate court upon the clerk of the trial court, when all fees had been paid
him timely.
72. Wischer v. Madison Realty Company, 128 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1961).
73. Mr. Justice Ilamiter concurred, entertaining "the view that the motion
to dismiss the appeal is completely without merit." 242 La. 334, 348, 136 So. 2d
62, 67 (1961).
74. LA. R.S. 13:4445 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 38, § 1.
75. The former LA. R.S. 13:4443 (1950), originally adopted by La. Acts
1910, No. 229, § 1, and subsequently amended by La. Acts 1918, No. 265.
76. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2129 (1960).
77. 135 So. 2d 925 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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on appeal. However, the appellate court's solution of the problem
appears sound. Any actual prejudice to an appellee in such cases
can be corrected by an appellate court through an order of sup-
plementation or correction of the record on appeal.
78
Tri-State Finance Corp. v. Surry 79 recognized a limitation
on the function of the answer to the appeal which should prove
useful in the future. There, in a proceeding via ordinaria plain-
tiff sought to enforce a chattel mortgage on a pickup truck
and a sedan owned by defendant; and in connection therewith
had both vehicles sequestered. The case went to trial on the
merits of the defenses urged in the answer, none of which are
pertinent here. After trial, but prior to judgment, defendant
moved successfully to dissolve the sequestration of the pickup
truck on the ground that it was exempt from seizure, and for
damages for the illegal seizure. This motion was disposed of
by separate judgment, dissolving the sequestration and award-
ing defendant $250 attorney's fees. By another judgment (on
the merits), the trial court awarded plaintiff the relief prayed
for. Plaintiff suspensively appealed from the judgment dis-
solving the sequestration and mulcting it in damages; and de-
fendant answered this appeal, praying for the reversal of the
judgment on the merits. On the original hearing, the Court of
Appeal for the First Circuit reviewed both judgments, with one
judge dissenting. On rehearing, however, the appellate court
held that the judgment on the merits could not be reviewed
under defendant's answer to plaintiff's appeal from the judg-
ment dissolving the sequestration.
In Franks v. Harper,"" the appellant had failed to comply
with certain requirements of the new Code relating to the ap-
peal."' The appellee, apparently not noticing these irregularities,
first answered the appeal and prayed for damages for a frivolous
appeal. Thereafter, the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal
on the ground of these irregularities. The intermediate appellate
court properly held that the appellee had waived his objections
to the irregularities complained of by answering the appeal.
78. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2132 (1960).
79. 139 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
80. 134 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
81. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2125 (1960), requiring the motion for
an extension of the return day to be filed by the clerk of the trial court; and id.
art. 2126 requiring the payment to the clerk of the trial court of his fees for
preparing the transcript and the filing fee in the appellate court.
393.1963J
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SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
Prior to July 1, 1960, the intermediate appellate courts had
no supervisory jurisdiction except in aid of their appellate juris-
diction.82 Under the appellate reorganization which went into
effect on that date, each court of appeal "has supervisory juris-
diction, subject to the general supervisory jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, over all inferior courts in all cases in which an
appeal would lie to the court of appeal."8 8
Quite early the Supreme Court made it known that it would
not entertain any application for supervisory writs in a case
over which an intermediate appellate court had appellate juris-
diction unless the relator had unsuccessfully sought supervisory
relief from the proper court of appeal. While statistics are not
available as to the number of applications for supervisory relief
presented to the Supreme Court in such cases, there appears to
have been only one instance where our highest court actually
granted supervisory relief refused by an intermediate appellate
court.
8 4
With but the single exception noted hereafter, this constitu-
tional provision appears to be working well in actual operation.
The reported cases do not indicate that any great burden has
been placed on the courts of appeal through this grant of super-
visory jurisdiction; and applications to the intermediate ap-
pellate courts for supervisory writs appear to be relatively few"
and to have been handled expeditiously and without difficulty.
However, Moity v. Mahfouz86 indicates the need of an au-
thoritative interpretation of some of the language of this con-
82. Putnam & Norman v. Levee, 179 La. 180, 153 So. 685 (1934) and cases
cited therein.
83. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 29, as amended pursuant to La. Acts 1958, No.
561.
84. Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., 241 La. 824, 132 So. 2d 55 (1961). How-
ever, Li Rocchi v. Keen, 127 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) and Id., 127 So .2d
47 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), which granted relators the supervisory relief sought,
were reversed 'by the Supreme Court. Id., 242 La. 111, 134 So. 2d 893 (1961),
noted 22 LA. L. Rgv. 671 (1962).
85. During the past term these cases included Vincent v. Grain Dealers Mutual
Insurance Co., 134 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; Finn v. Uddo, 135 So. 2d
364 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961); Gaspard v. Lemaire, 136 So. 2d 97 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962) ; Duvigneaud v. Marcello, 136 So. 2d 176 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ;
Rhea v. Welch, 136 So. 2d 322 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Kroger, 136 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961); Estate of
Helis v. Hoth, 137 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Moity v. Mahfouz, 137
So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961) ; and Alphonse Mortgage Co. v. Saucier, 138
So. 2d 849 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
86. 137 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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stitutional provision by the Supreme Court. There, the relator
had been sentenced to jail for contempt of the trial court for
inserting insulting and scandalous allegations in his petition
to recover on a promissory note; and having no remedy by ap-
peal, he applied to the court of appeal for supervisory relief.
The intermediate appellate court held that the proceeding for
contempt was independent of the case in which it had been
brought, and since there was no appeal from the contempt
sentence, it had no supervisory jurisdiction in the matter. Rela-
tor then applied to the Supreme Court for supervisory writs,
but that court refused to issue them on the ground that the
errors complained of did not justify its exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction.8 7 However, the Supreme Court's per curiam con-
tained the following caveat: "By denying this application for
writs we are in no way approving of the holding of the Court
of Appeal that it is without supervisory jurisdiction."
It is believed that the Supreme Court's reasons for question-
ing this decision of the court of appeal are completely valid. The
grant of supervisory jurisdiction to the intermediate appellate
courts was intended to be as broad as their appellate jurisdic-
tion; and if any court of appeal would have appellate jurisdic-
tion over the final judgment in any case, it has supervisory
jurisdiction to review any order or action of the trial court in
that case, regardless of connexity with the merits of that case.
Any other construction of the constitutional provision would not
only render the supervisory jurisdiction of the intermediate
appellate courts shadowy and uncertain, but would serve to
defeat the very purpose of that grant of supervisory jurisdic-
tion.
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS
Garnishment
An important clarification of garnishment procedure under
the new Code was made by Succession of Hoffman."" One of
the new Code's provisions reiterates the general rule contained
in the Code of Practice that the sheriff must serve a notice of
seizure upon the judgment 'debtor, after a seizure has been made
in the execution of the judgment.8 9 The basic article of the new
87. Moity v. Mahfouz, 242 La. 625, 137 So. 2d 514 (1961).
88. 141 So. 2d 505 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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Code relating to garnishment procedure requires that the notice
of seizure be served on the garnishee, but does not require a
similar service to be made on the judgment debtor.9 0 Prior to
1961, it was settled that no such service need be made.9 1 In
Hoffman, the judgment debtor contended that the garnishment
process was invalid because he had never been served with a
notice of the seizure under garnishment. This contention was
rejected by the appellate court through reliance on the rationale
of earlier cases. When the sheriff seizes property to be sold
under execution, the judgment debtor must be notified of the
seizure so that he may appoint one of the appraisers to value
the property; otherwise, the subsequent sale is a nullity. But
when the seizure is of the indebtedness of a third person to
the judgment debtor, which can be paid to the sheriff without
any sale, there is no real necessity for the judgment debtor to
be notified of the seizure under garnishment.
Examination of Judgment Debtor
Rarely does a case in this area ever reach an appellate court.
One did during the past term9 2 and it served a useful purpose
in construing the articles of the new Code on the subject. The
basic article on the subject provides that "the judgment creditor
may examine the judgment debtor, his books, papers, or docu-
ments," either in open court or through deposition. 3 Ex-
amination of the judgment debtor through deposition was bor-
rowed from the Federal Rules; but the source provision is much
broader than our code article in permitting examination by
deposition of "any person, including the judgment debtor. ' 94
In the single case on the subject, the intermediate appellate
court held that our code rule permitted only the examination
of the judgment debtor, and his books and papers; and did not
allow the examination of a third person, or his books and papers.
The decision seems completely sound, from the standpoint of
both statutory construction and public policy. If the judgment
creditor has reason to believe that a third person is indebted to
the judgment debtor, he may always garnish the third person;
89. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2293 (1960).
90. Id. art. 2412.
91. Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Myrtle G[Five Syrup Co., 175 La. 969, 144
So. 730 (1932) and cases cited therein.
92. Simmesport State Bank v. Scallan, 134 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961).
93. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2451 (1960).
94. Rule 69(a), FED. R. CIV. PRoc.
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and if the latter's answers to the garnishment interrogatories
are negative, in the process of traversing them he may then ex-
amine the garnishee and compel him to produce his books and
papers.
EXECUTORY PROCESS
In the opinion of this writer, the closest case decided by any
of the appellate courts during the past term is Li Rocchi v.
Keen,95 where the issue was whether sufficient authentic evi-
dence had been presented to the trial judge to justify his order
for seizure and sale of mortgaged property. The mortgage notes
sought to be enforced were made payable to "Ourselves"; and
these notes were actually endorsed in blank by the mortgagors.
However, the act of mortgage did not recite this endorsement
in blank, nor did it recite the delivery of the notes to the plain-
tiffs. Because of these omissions in the act of mortgage, the
defendants sought to enjoin the seizure and sale in the trial
court on the ground of the lack of sufficient authentic evidence.
The trial court refused to enjoin the seizure and sale, but under
its supervisory jurisdiction the Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit reversed, holding the authentic evidence insufficient."
Under its supervisory jurisdiction in turn the Supreme Court
reversed, holding (with Justices McCaleb and Summers dis-
senting) that since the defendants had admitted that plaintiffs
were the original and only holders of the mortgage notes sought
to be enforced, the authentic evidence presented to the trial
judge was sufficient for him to order the seizure and sale of
the properties. An unusually acute analysis of this case is made
in a Note in the Review, 97 to which the reader is referred. For
present purposes, it suffices for this writer to record his com-
plete agreement with the analysis and conclusions of the able
student author.
CURATORSHIP OF INTERDICTS
In Panzica v. Panzica,98 the curator of an interdict sued his
ward to recover substantial sums of money allegedly advanced
95. 242 La. 111, 134 So. 2d 893 (1961), noted 22 LA. L. REV. 671 (1962).
This case was governed by the applicable rules of LA. CODE OF PRACTICE (1870)
and of the jurisprudence thereunjer; but the new Code has made no change of
the applicable rules. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 2635, 2636 (1960).
96. Li Rocchi v. Keen, 127 So. 2d 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Id., 127 So. 2d
47 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
97. Note, 22 LA. L. REV. 671 (1962).
98. 132 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
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for her account. Although an undercurator had been appointed
for the interdict and was still acting as such, at the instance
of the plaintiff, the trial court appointed an attorney at law
to represent the interdict. The attorneys so appointed filed
exceptions of no right and no cause of action, of prescription,
and also filed an answer denying the plaintiff's allegations and
calling for strict proof thereof. After a trial, the trial court
dismissed the action, holding that the undercurator was the
proper representative of the interdict, and not an attorney ap-
pointed by the court. The intermediate appellate court affirmed.
The case was governed by the rules of the Code of Practice;
but the same result would have obtained under the new pro-
cedural Code.99
There is some language in the appellate court's opinion, how-
ever, that requires qualification. The trial judge's Reasons for
Judgment, quoted in part with approval in the appellate opinion,
states that "'the articles of the Civil Code and Code of Prac-
tice ... make it plain that the undercurator is the person who
is to represent the interdict in suits wherein the interdict and
curator have conflicting interests.'"
This is too broad a statement of the rule. Both before"00
and under the new procedural Code' 0 an attorney at law must
be appointed to represent an interdict in a partition proceeding,
when he and his curator have conflicting interests.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection
In State v. Clark' a colored defendant, who had been con-
victed of aggravated rape by an all white jury, urged racial
discrimination as a principal basis for his appeal. Systematic
exclusion was not established by the facts that there were only
three Negro names on the petit jury list of 30, and that only 15
99. See LA. COVE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts.'4202, 4553 (1960).
100. LA. CML CoDE art. 1368 (1870), repealed by La. Acts 1962, No. 70.
101. LA. CoDz OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4643 (1960), added by La. Acts 1962,
No. 92, § 6.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 242 La. 914, 140 So. 2d 1 (1962).
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